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July 6, 2006 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Explicit treatment of transportation costs has received relatively little attention
in the international trade literature. Samuelson (1954), in an analysis of the
transfer problem, developed what has become known as the "iceberg" model of
transport costs. In the iceberg model, transporting goods costs some proportion
of either the goods’ value or the physical quantity. The advantage of this ap-
proach is that transportation costs simply act as a kind of simple tax for which
there is no revenue produced. In international trade models, its like there is a
tariﬀ that produces no revenue. In these models the standard trade theorems
hold.
The next major theoretical advance in modeling transportation costs was
by Falvey (1976). He treats transportation as services that need to be con-
sumed in order for international trade to take place. Falvey explicitly models a
transportation sector and shows that in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework the main
trade theorems go through and the analysis is modiﬁed in straightforward ways.
Despite these theoretical developments recent empirical work on transportation
costs point in another direction.
Hummels and Skiba (2004) in a paper about whether high or low quality
goods are more likely to be exported ﬁnd that, "...we provide strong evidence
against a widely used assumption in the trade literature: that transportation
costs are of the ’iceberg’ form, proportional to goods prices." In a diﬀerent
context, Hummels and Skiba (2002) argue that economies of scale in transport
are important and in part, these economies may derive from large ﬁxed costs
of trade. Our purpose here is to explore a model in which there are economies
of scale in transport. For simplicity we do this by introducing ﬁxed costs of
transportation into a model of international trade and work out the implications.
We develop a simple two country model of international trade that assumes
that there is a ﬁxed cost of doing international trade. We show that this leads
to multiple equilibria that can be Pareto-ranked. There are high volume of
trade, medium volume of trade and no trade (autarky) equilibria. The high
trade equilibrium is best and autarky is worst. Then, we examine the stability
properties of these equilibria and show that the high trade equilibrium and
autarky are stable while the medium volume of trade equilibrium is unstable. We
argue that some countries could be in an autarky trap since in the neighborhood
of autarky, because of the ﬁx e dt r a n s po r t a t i o nc o s t ,t h e yw o u l dh a v en oi n c e n t i v e
to engage in international trade.
The model is developed in section 2, oﬀer curves are derived in section 3,
equilibrium solved for in section 4, a Ricardian example is developed in section
5, stability and eﬃciency are discussed in section 6, and policy conclusions are
discussed in section 7.
22 The General Model
We consider a model in which two goods, labelled 1 and 2, are exchanged be-
tween two countries, a home country and a foreign country. All foreign country
variables are indicated by asterisks (*). The two goods are produced within each
country under perfect competition and with constant returns to scale produc-
tion functions with the help of m ≥ 1 internationally immobile factors. The
domestic (respectively foreign) prices of the goods 1 and 2 are denoted by p1
and p2 (respectively p∗
1 and p∗
2). Assuming that the production functions exhibit
the usual properties (such as the Inada conditions in the two-factor case) the
autarkic supply functions (i.e. when no resources are used for transportation)







j ),i ,j=1 ,2,i6= j, respectively in the home and
foreign countries with S0
i > 0 and S∗0
i > 0.
The role of transportation costs is central in our model. In particular, we are
interested in the eﬀect of ﬁxed costs of transportation that may be associated
with international trade. These may include the costs of shipping goods from one
country to the other or costs of setting up distribution and marketing networks.
We focus here on the case when the transportation costs include only ﬁxed (but
not sunk) costs1. For simplicity, we suppose that shipping goods from the home
(respectively foreign) country to the foreign (respectively home) country requires
investing a fraction β (respectively β
∗) of all the domestic (respectively foreign)
factor resources whatever the (strictly positive) volume of trade. Together with
constant returns to scale (CRS), this assumption allows us to rule out any eﬀect
of transportation activities on factor prices. The eﬀect of opening the economy is
simply to reduce proportionally by a factor β (β
∗) the stocks of factors available
for production activities. Since the CRS assumption rules out size eﬀects, it is
clear that at given domestic (respectively foreign) prices the factor prices are the
same in free trade as in autarky. It follows that the total domestic (respectively
foreign) factor income Y (respectivelyY ∗) equals its autarkic value, itself equal
to the value of the autarkic domestic (respectively foreign) output valued at























We assume average cost pricing in transportation activities. These ﬁxed
transport costs could be ﬁnanced in a variety of ways, and while we acknowl-
edge that the method of ﬁnancing these activities is potentially important, we
wish to keep the model as simple as possible in order to focus on the eﬀects
of the ﬁxed costs. Accordingly, we assume that when there is international
trade the diﬀerence between the foreign and the domestic prices of the exported
1Adding variable costs would not change the results in any signiﬁcant way.
3goods times the volume of exports exactly covers the ﬁxed transportation cost
expenditures. This can be thought of as an equilibrium condition: the home
(respectively foreign) ﬁrms must be indiﬀerent between selling on the home and
on the foreign markets.
The equilibrium proﬁts are zero and the total domestic (respectively foreign)
income is then equal to the factor income Y (respectively Y ∗). Finally the
domestic and foreign free trade supply functions may be written respectively as
(1 − β) Si(
pi




pj),i ,j=1 ,2,i 6= j, i.e. as ﬁxed fractions of
t h ea u t a r k i cs u p p l i e s .
The consumption demands in the home and foreign countries are derived
from the maximization of two thrice continuously diﬀerentiable concave utility
functions U(C1,C 2) for the home country and U∗(C∗
1,C∗
2) for the foreign country
subject to the budget constraints which are respectively






2 = Y ∗ (4)




















),i , j=1 ,2,i 6= j (6)
We assume that the ﬁrst derivatives of these demand functions are strictly
positive, i.e. that the two goods are normal. Notice that, given equations (1)
and (2) these demands depend only on relative good prices and that they are




























As is well known the income and substitution eﬀects have the same sign in
the case of exports so that, if i is an exported good, d0
i(
pj




T h es i g n so ft h et w oe ﬀects are opposite in the case of imports so that one
cannot say a priori anything on the sign of the above derivatives.
Notice that for given relative prices, these demand functions do not depend
on β or β
∗. This means that transportation costs have no direct eﬀect on
demand.
4For convenience, we assume that if trade takes place the home country ex-
ports good 1. Hence,
X1(p,β)=( 1− β)S1(p) − d1(p)
and
M2(p,β)=d2(p) − (1 − β)S2(p)












1(p∗) − (1 − β
∗)S∗
1(p∗)
are the export supply and import demand functions, respectively.
Average cost pricing in the transportation industries implies that
(p∗











From equations (1) and (3) we obtain
p1X1(p,β)=p2M2(p,β)+β(p1S1(p)+p2S2(p))





p2 denotes the ratio between the c.a.f. prices of the two goods. By






It is worth noting that these "balance of trade" equilibrium conditions (equa-
tions (11) and (12)), contrary to the standard model of international trade with-
out transportation costs, do not simply follow from the domestic and the foreign
budget constraints. In order to derive them, we have assumed condition (9) and
condition (10). These two conditions already have an equilibrium interpretation:
they imply that the domestic (respectively foreign) ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between
selling on the domestic or the foreign market. If they hold, then international
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3T h e O ﬀer Curves
We are now able to construct the home and foreign "oﬀer curves" that specify
the amount of exports a country is willing to supply in exchange for each possible
level of imports. Given our previous assumptions if there is international trade
then, the home country exports good 1 and exports good 2 while this is the
reverse for the foreign country.
In order for international trade to take place each country has to gain
enough from trade to cover the ﬁxed transportation costs. For example, the
home country is willing to trade if and only if the home domestic relative export
price p is not lower than the critical value p(β) which is unambiguously deﬁned
by X1(p(β),β)=0 2. This critical price is easily proved to be an increasing
function of β. Accordingly, the minimum volume of imports below which the
home country is not willing to trade at all is M2(β)=M2(p(β),β) where M2
is itself strictly increasing in β. Since M2 is a strictly increasing function of p
we may use the Inverse Function Theorem which guarantees the existence of an
2given equation (15) it is easy to show that p(β) ≥ pA.
6inverse function ρ ≡ M
−1
2 . The oﬀer curve of the home country is now simply
deﬁned as
X1 = f(M2,β)=m a x {0,X 1(ρ(M2,β),β)} (13)
Obviously, f(M2,β)=0 for all M2 ≤ M2(β). Moreover
∂f(M2,β)
∂β < 0.To
s e eh o wt h eo ﬀer curve is aﬀected by ﬁxed transportation costs consider Figure
1. The usual domestic oﬀer curve with no ﬁxed transportation costs (β =0 )is
OD. It is convex since to a given domestic price ratio p must correspond under
the usual assumptions to one and only one couple (X1,M 2). We assume that it
is strictly convex3. The slope of the tangent OE to OD at the origin is equal
to the autarkic equilibrium price ratio pA.
Now consider the home country oﬀer curve when there are ﬁxed transport
costs. The home country oﬀer curve corresponding to some β>0 is OM2A.
At any point A on the home country oﬀe rc u r v ew ed e d u c ef r o me q u a t i o n( 1 1 )
that the value of the international relative price v equals the slope of OA. For
suﬃciently low values of β it must be convex for all M2 >M 2(β) as pictured
above. A necessary condition for the home country being willing to trade is
obviously that the international relative price v of good 1 be larger than a value
v(β) equal to the slope of OC which is itself strictly larger than the autarkic
equilibrium price ratio pA. Thus, with ﬁxed transportation costs the domestic
country requires more gains from trade (a higher relative price for good 1)b e f o r e
it is willing to engage in international trade. Of course v(β) tends toward pA
as β tends toward 0. Notice that for any value of v larger than v(β) there
correspond two points on the home oﬀer curve and hence two possible trade
vectors and two possible values of the domestic relative price p.
The foreign oﬀer curve is aﬀected in the same way. The foreign country
is willing to trade if and only if the foreign domestic relative price of im-
ports p∗ is not larger than a critical value p∗(β




∗)=0 . Accordingly, the minimum volume of imports below which







strictly increasing in β
∗.M ∗
1 being a strictly decreasing function of p∗ we may
use the Inverse Function Theorem which guarantees the existence of M∗
1
−1 ≡ σ.



















Figure 2 shows foreign country oﬀer curves for β
∗ =0and β
∗ > 0. At
any point A on this curve it follows from equation (12) that the corresponding
international price ratio v equals the slope of OA. By the same argument used
above for establishing the convexity of the home oﬀer curve, the foreign oﬀer
3This amounts to ruling out ﬂat parts of the usual oﬀer curves as occur in the Ricardian
case. This assumption ensures that for low transport costs and a volume of imports above
a given minimum the home oﬀer curve is convex. However as shown in Section 5 for the
Ricardian case, this assumption is too strong: in this case indeed the home oﬀer curve is
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Figure 2:
8curve is concave for suﬃciently low values of β





∗). The foreign country is willing to trade if and only if the international
price ratio v is lower than the critical value v(β
∗) corresponding to the slope of
the tangent OC∗ to the oﬀer curve from the origin. Of course v(β
∗) is lower
than the foreign autarkic price ratio pA∗ given by the slope of OE∗.
4 The Equilibria







2) satisfy the market-clearing conditions (from Walras Law equilibrium








We assume without loss of generality that pA <p A∗, i.e. that the home country
has a comparative advantage in good 1.
Whenever the ﬁxed transportation costs are both strictly positive (i.e. when-
ever β>0 and/or β
∗ > 0) autarky is an equilibrium of our model. When the
volume of trade is arbitrarily low no ﬁrm expects to be able to cover the ﬁxed
cost expenditures which it would have to make in order to enter the transporta-
tion industry. Put another way, at autarky, the prices of transportation services
per unit of good shipped are so large as to discourage any trade4.T h i s l o o k s
like a "low level equilibrium trap": there is no trade because at the margin
transportation costs are very large but the transportation costs are large be-
cause there is no trade. However, it remains to show that there may also exist
equilibria with positive volumes of trade.
An international (i.e. with positive trade) equilibrium of this model is
formally a triple of relative prices (p,p∗,v) such that (i) the two goods markets
clear and (ii) the two transportation industries break even. As usual, owing
to Walras Law, one of these conditions is redundant so that one is left with
three equations in three unknowns. Interestingly enough the two goods market
clearing equations are



















4They indeed tend toward inﬁnity.
9These equations determine the domestic relative prices in the home and foreign
countries and thereby all the relevant quantities (output, consumption, import
and export levels ) independently of the budget balance conditions for the trans-
portation industries. Then either condition (11) or condition (12) determines the
international price ratio v so as to satisfy budget balance in the transportation
industry.
T os e eh o wt h em od e lw o r k si th e l p st oﬁrst consider the classical case without
transportation costs (β = β
∗ =0 ). Here, at free trade, the two relative prices,
home and foreign, must coincide in equilibrium ( p = p∗ = v) and conditions
(11) and (12) are automatically satisﬁed. Moreover, from Walras Law, the
second market clears if the ﬁrst one does (and reciprocally) so that we are left




v) − S1(v) − S∗
1(v)=0 . Under standard assumptions
the excess demand for good 1 (E1) is a continuous function of v, is positive
when v =0 , and tends toward a strictly negative value when v tends toward
inﬁnity. This ensures the existence of at least one equilibrium, i.e. of a value b v
such that E1(b v)=0 . As is well-known, this equilibrium is unique whenever the
condition below is satisﬁed.
Condition 1 (Marshall-Lerner) ε(v)+ε∗(v) > 1
Where ε(v) and ε∗(v) are respectively the home and foreign price-elasticities
of imports. Recalling that home imports of good 2 are M2 = C2−S2 and foreign











We next turn to determining equilibrium. Equilibrium occurs when the two
oﬀer curves intersect since that is where import demands are equal to export
supplies. In the case without transportation costs (dotted curves in Figure 3),
the Marshall-Lerner Condition ensures that the oﬀer curves cut only twice, at
O (autarky) and at E (free trade equilibrium.) However, only E corresponds to
an equilibrium since at O the relative prices pA and pA∗ diﬀer, giving rise to the
possibility of costless and proﬁtable trade.
When there exist small but strictly positive transportation costs a simple
continuity argument shows that there now exist two international equilibria
with positive amounts of trade, a "high" equilibrium at H , near E, and an
"intermediate" equilibrium at I, near O with an international equilibrium price
ratio respectively equal to the slopes of OH and of OI. Moreover as shown
above autarky now becomes an equilibrium with equilibrium home and foreign
autarkic relative prices equal to the slopes of OE and OE∗.
Proposition 1 For small enough values of β and β
∗,s u c ht h a ta tl e a s tβ or
β
∗ > 0, there exist three equilibria which are ranked by increasing volumes of
trade: autarky, an "intermediate trade" equilibrium and a "high trade" equilib-
rium.
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Figure 3:
115T h e R i c a r d i a n c a s e
Here labor is the only factor both in production and transportation activities.
The unit labor requirement in the production of good i i nt h eh o m ec o u n t r y
is ai. All foreign country variables are indicated by asterisks (*). Without loss
of generality we assume as in the previous Sections that the home country has
a comparative advantage in the production of good 1, or, equivalently, that the













































M2 = d2(p) (19)
X1 = pd2(p) −
βL
a1
It is then easy to build the home oﬀer curve as
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Figure 4 below illustrates the determination of country A’s oﬀer curve OABC.
Note that OA= F
a2, OR=− F
a1 and OE=gA2(a1
a2). The slope of OB equals a1
a2. The
coordinates of point D for instance give the amounts of exports of good 1 and
imports of good 2 which country A wants to trade when the domestic price ratio
p1
p2 equals the slope of RD. The speciﬁcity of the Ricardian case is the existence
of a ﬂat part of the oﬀer curves (AB in Figure 2).





























































If and only if the values of β and β




























there exists an intermediate equilibrium where the ﬂat parts of the two oﬀer
curves intersect: at this equilibrium the two countries produce the two goods5
and the relative internal equilibrium prices equal their respective autarkic values,
i.e. p = a1

















2 . The welfare at this intermediate equilibrium is the
same in both countries as at the autarkic equilibrium. This follows simply from
the fact that the relative internal prices and hence the consumption levels are
identical. It is indeed easy to see that the amounts of labor which are saved in
the two countries by having each of them produce more of the good in which
it has a comparative advantage and less of the other are exactly equal to the
quantities of labor required in order to ship the goods between countries, namely
M∗
1(a∗
1 − a1)+M2(a2 − a∗
2)=βL+ β
∗L∗. From the general Proposition 1 for
small enough values of β and β
∗ there also exists a high equilibrium . At this
equilibrium at least country is fully specialized. This is pictured in Figure 5
below for the case where both countries are fully specialized at H..
We next turn to consideration of the properties of these three equilibria.
6S t a b i l i t y a n d E ﬃciency
6.1 Stability
In this section we conﬁne ourselves to the case of positive ﬁxed transport costs
of trade (β>0 and β
∗ > 0). We begin by investigating the (local) Walrasian
stability of the three equilibria. The essential idea of Walrasian stability is that
an equilibrium is stable if, when price is above the equilibrium price, then sup-
ply exceeds demand. If the price is below the equilibrium price, then demand
exceeds supply. We are willing to deﬁne here stability along these lines. An
international equilibrium has been deﬁned above as a triple of relative prices.
In order to analyze a simple tâtonnement process in a neighborhood of an in-
ternational equilibrium we require that conditions (11) and (12) be satisﬁed
everywhere, i.e. there is average cost pricing of transportation services even
out of equilibrium. Under this assumption there are, in a neighborhood of an
international equilibrium like H or I, two one to one correspondences , deﬁned
by (11) and (12), between the international price ratio v and, respectively, the
home and foreign domestic price ratios p and p∗. It follows that the value of


























O                                                                                                                  X1,M*1 
Figure 5:
15v completely determines the initial conditions of the tâtonnement process in a
neighborhood of an international equilibrium
Deﬁnition: Equilibrium price v0 is a locally stable international equilibrium
price if the following two conditions hold:
a.) v ≥ v0 ⇒ X1(v) ≥ M∗
1(v) and M2(v) ≥ X∗
2(v)
b.) v ≤ v0 ⇒ X1(v) ≤ M∗
1(v) and M2(v) ≤ X∗
2(v).
Using this deﬁnition we determine which of the two international equilibria
equilibria we have is stable. The three equilibria are illustrated in Figure 6. We
have the "high" equilibrium at H, the "intermediate" equilibrium at I and au-
tarky at 0. First, consider the high equilibrium. Suppose that the international
price v is less than the equilibrium price v0. A tt h a tp r i c et h eh o m ec o u n t r y
will trade at point B and the foreign country at point C. It is clear from Figure
6 this means that the foreign demand for imports of good one exceeds the home
supply of exports of good one and in the market for good two, foreign export
supply exceed home import demand. That is, when v ≤ v0 ⇒ X1(v) ≤ M∗
1(v)
and M2(v) ≤ X∗
2(v), hence condition b is satisﬁed. If we consider prices above
equilibrium, it is also clear that the reasoning above is simply reversed and
condition a is satisﬁed. Therefore, Hi sas t a b l ee q u i l i b r i u m .
Next consider equilibrium point I. If we consider a price below equilibrium
then the home country would trade at B in Figure 7 and the foreign country
would trade at A. That means that when the price is below the equilibrium the
foreign demand for imports of good one is less than the home supply of exports
of good one and in the market for good two, foreign export supply falls short of
home import demand. Thus, if v ≤ v0 ⇒ X1(v) ≥ M∗
1(v) and M2(v) ≥ X∗
2(v)
and condition b is violated. The reader can easily verify that condition a also
fails and therefore, the equilibrium at I is unstable.
Finally, and perhaps, most importantly, consider autarky. In the case of
autarky we have to consider the relative prices in each country. Stability of
autarky requires that in the home country for a value of p larger (respectively
lower) than pA there is an excess supply of (respectively excess demand for)
good 1 and an excess demand for (respectively excess supply of) good 2 on the
home markets and symmetrically in the foreign country. This turns out to be
true in a neighborhood of autarkic prices since pA <p (β) and p∗A > p∗(β
∗).
When the domestic price ratios p and p∗ do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from their
autarkic equilibrium values the two countries do not want to trade. Due to the
ﬁxed transport costs the excess of production over domestic demand of some
good does not translate into some positive export supply.
We summarize these results in a proposition.
Proposition 2 (Stability) The high trade equilibrium and autarky are stable
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Figure 7:
186.2 Eﬃciency
We next consider eﬃciency. The central question we ask is whether the three
equilibria can be ranked? We are able to show that in fact, all three equilibria
can be Pareto-ranked.
Proposition 3 (Eﬃciency) With ﬁxed costs of transportation the three equi-
libria can be Pareto-ranked. The high trade equilibrium Pareto-dominates the
intermediate trade equilibrium which in turn, Pareto-dominates the autarkic
equilibrium.
Proof. First, consider the home oﬀer curve. It follows from convexity assump-
tions made earlier that, moving from the left to the right on the home oﬀer
curve means M2 is increasing as is p.S o ,M2 is increasing in p.B yt h es a m e
argument M∗
1 is decreasing in p∗ moving from the left to the right on the foreign
oﬀer curve. It follows then, that at the high equilibrium point H, p is higher
and p∗ is lower than at the intermediate equilibrium point I. This means that
the wedge between the internal home and foreign relative prices is lower at H
than at I. This reasoning also shows that the wedge is lower at I than it is at O.
The second step is now to show that the home welfare W(p)=U(C1(p),C 2(p))
is increasing in p while the foreign welfare W∗(p∗)=U∗(C∗
1(p∗),C∗
2(p∗)) is

















Since at equilibrium the home national income is maximized pS0
1(p)+S0
2(p)=
0 and we can safely conclude that
W0(p)=U0
2(C1(p),C 2(p))[S1(p) − C1(p)] > 0










Remark: Though the "high trade equilibrium", when it exists, Pareto-
dominates both the intermediate and the autarkic equilibrium it is not Pareto-
eﬃcient. Eﬃciency would indeed require that prices equal marginal costs.
Speciﬁcally, since the marginal transport costs are zero in this model there
should be no diﬀerence between home and foreign prices. This is not the case
19here owing to average cost pricing in the transportation industries: import
prices are above marginal costs in both countries and the levels of consumption
of imported (respectively exported) goods are accordingly below (respectively
above) their optimal levels.
7 Concluding remarks and extensions
The basic message of this paper is clear. While there may exist some scope for
mutually proﬁtable North-South (interindustry) trade based on comparative
advantage the world may well be trapped in some low level equilibrium (here
the autarkic one) where, due to the existence of ﬁxed transportation costs,
low trade volumes lead to large unit transport prices which themselves induce
in turn low trade volumes. The dimension of this ”trap” can be informally
measured by the distance between this (stable) low level equilibrium and the
(unstable) intermediate equilibrium, a distance which is increasing in the ﬁxed
transportation costs. One could think that getting out of this trap may require
some kind of ”big push”, for instance some public investments in transport
infrastructures: by doing so one could expect the emergence of a "high trade"
equilibrium. Moreover, if these investments be ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxation,
an additional source of ineﬃciency, the divergence between the home and foreign
relative prices, could be eliminated. Notice, however, that such a move would
require some coordination between the governments of the two countries.
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